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Recently, the nature of one of the aspects of the Biosimilar, Price,
Competition, and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”) has been called
into question: Is the “patent dance,” the structured patent dispute resolution process of the BPCIA, mandatory or optional? A mandatory patent dance requires a biosimilar applicant to comply with all its requirements, while an optional patent dance allows the biosimilar applicant to
opt out of the entire dance if it so chooses. This question is important because it has the potential to affect that delicate balance of the BPCIA.
This Note focuses on some of the consequential implications of deciding
whether the patent dance of the BPCIA is optional or mandatory. This
Note ultimately argues that the patent dance of the BPCIA should be
mandatory.
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INTRODUCTION
Biologics are the future of the pharmaceutical industry.1 While
research, development, and spending for new innovative smallmolecule drugs have remained stagnant,2 there has been an explosion in spending and progress in the field of biologics.3 In 2016, the
annual global spending on biologics alone was projected to be between $200 billion and $210 billion.4 Some healthcare industry
analysts predict that, in the United States, biologics will represent
half of the annual prescription drug spending by 2020.5 This explosion is well deserved, as the most prominent, promising, and profitable cures to major diseases are in the field of biologics.6 However, the very nature of biologics and its complex manufacturing and
development process also make them some of the most expensive
pharmaceuticals.7 To address this problem, Congress enacted the
Biosimilar, Price, Competition, and Innovation Act of 2009
(“BPCIA”).8
The BPCIA has been described as a “riddle wrapped in a mystery in an enigma.”9 The BPCIA’s complexity stems partly from
the fact that the nature of a biologic itself is extremely complex and
not yet fully understood.10 The BPCIA’s location at the intersec1

See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016).
2
Id. (“Spending on small-molecule drugs is close to stagnant, especially in developed
countries.”).
3
IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE GLOBAL USE OF MEDICINES:
OUTLOOK THROUGH 2016 at 3 (2012).
4
Id.
5
Price & Rai, supra note 1.
6
Id.; see Julia Kollewe, World’s 10 Bestselling Prescription Drugs Made $75bn Last
Year, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/27/
bestselling-prescription-drugs [http://perma.cc/ZYR6-3PQZ].
7
See Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 (2008); Joyce
Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of Biotechnology, Patent Law,
and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 535–36 (2010).
8
The principal section of the BPCIA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). The
BPCIA was passed as part of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).
Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25,
26, 29, 42 U.S.C).
9
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 808 (2017).
10
See Tam, supra note 7, at 536.
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tion of patent law and pharmaceutical regulation exacerbates the
BPCIA’s complexity.11 Furthermore, the BPCIA has the complicated responsibility of accomplishing two countervailing goals.12
The BPCIA seeks to find the complex, yet delicate, balance between allowing biosimilar manufacturers to introduce competition
to counter the unaffordable cost of biologics, while simultaneously
preserving the incentive for innovators to bring pioneering and essential biologics to market.13 At the same time, the BPCIA must
maintain the strict standard of pharmaceutical regulation that
Americans have come to expect and rely upon despite the delicate
and precise nature of biologics and biosimilars.14 The BPCIA attempts to balance all of these complex, yet crucial aspects.15
This complexity and sensitivity makes every aspect of the
BPCIA essential, because the BPCIA was designed to maintain that
delicate balance between the two countervailing goals of the
BPCIA.16 Conversely, removing or changing any aspect of the

11

See, e.g., Linfong Tzeng, Follow-On Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135, 156 (2010) (discussing how differences in data exclusivity in the
patent and regulatory framework are troubling).
12
See, e.g., Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a
Delicate Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 650
(2014) (“[T]he central mission of the BPCIA is to balance two competing interests:
innovation and accessibility.”).
13
Id. at 613.
14
See Vinita Banthia, Note, Biosimilar Regulation: Bringing the United States Up to Speed
with Other Markets, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 879, 883, 885 (2015) (“An effective
biosimilar approval pathway would necessarily need to strike a balance between ensuring
safety and providing affordable access to biologic medicines.”).
15
See Banthia, supra note 14, at 885; Tam, supra note 7, at 540 (“The resulting statute
balances the interests of the pioneer drug industry, the generic drug industry, and patients
seeking access to the best available medicines.”). This balancing of interests is also
present in other areas of the law. For an example of the balancing of interests in generic
drugs, see Sarah E. Eurek, Note, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2 (2003). For an
example of the balancing of interests with medical devices, see Adam Lewin, Note,
Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food and Drug Law and Patent Law,
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 404 (2012) (“The legal structures regulating the introduction
of medical devices must therefore strike a careful balance between promoting new and
better devices and ensuring that devices on the market are safe and effective.”).
16
See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285,
286 (2011).
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BPCIA may skew this important and delicate balance.17 Therefore,
it is critical to keep this delicate balance in mind in making a determination regarding any aspect of the BPCIA.
Recently, the nature of one of the BPCIA’s aspects has been
called into question: Is the “patent dance,” the structured patent
dispute resolution process of the BPCIA, mandatory or optional? A
mandatory patent dance requires a biosimilar applicant to comply
with all its requirements, while an optional patent dance allows the
biosimilar applicant to opt out of the entire dance if it so chooses.
This question is important because it has the potential to affect that
delicate balance of the BPCIA.
This Note focuses on some of the consequential implications of
deciding that the patent dance of the BPCIA is optional versus
mandatory. This Note ultimately argues that the patent dance of
the BPCIA should be mandatory. Part I provides the background to
the BPCIA by explaining what biologics and biosimilars are and
what makes them unique. Part I continues by explaining what the
patent dance is and what the Federal Circuit decided about this issue in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.18 Part II discusses the implications
that result as a consequence of an optional patent dance as opposed
to a mandatory patent dance. Finally, Part III argues that the
BPCIA constructs a delicate balance to its countervailing goals and,
therefore, the patent dance should be mandatory to maintain that
balance.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE BIOSIMILAR, PRICE,
COMPETITION, AND INNOVATION ACT
This Part provides background on the BPCIA and details the
origins of the question on whether the patent dance is optional or
mandatory. Section I.A explains what biologics are and what makes
them different than traditional small molecule drugs. Section I.B
explains why process patents may be biologic’s strongest source of
protection. Section I.C outlines the process to bring a successful
17

Cf. Lu, supra note 12, at 646 (discussing how the current BPCIA’s provisions on
exclusivity tip the scale in favor of innovator companies, and proposing a different frame
that better balances innovation and accessibility).
18
See 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017).
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biologic to the public in compliance with the relevant federal regulations and how that leads to the astronomical costs of biologics,
especially contrasted with small molecule drugs. Section I.D explains what biosimilars are and why traditional generics are not
available to resolve the problem of high cost as it was for small molecule drugs. Section I.E outlines the BPCIA and the BPCIA’s patent dance. Finally, Section I.F discusses the facts of Amgen v. Sandoz and follows its path to the Supreme Court.
A. What Is a Biologic?
A biologic is a type of pharmaceutical that is extremely complex19 and intricately dependent on its manufacturing process.20
The BPCIA defines a biologic, or “biological product,” as a “virus,
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product . . . applicable
to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of
human beings.”21 Essentially, biologics are protein-based macromolecules that have been created by living cells.22 Biologics are not
directly manufactured by humans; instead they are created by harnessing unique characteristics of certain specialized living cells.23
These cells are genetically engineered through recombinant DNA
technology to create a cell line that expresses or secretes the desired protein-based molecules.24 A familiar example of a biologic is
Humulin, which is an insulin used to control high blood sugar in
adults and children with diabetes.25
19

See, e.g., Jenny M. Alsup, You Can Dance If You Want To? Initial Interpretations of the
BPCIA’s Patent Dance with Sandoz and Amgen, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 137, 138
(2016).
20
See Lu, supra note 12, at 617 (“A minor change in the manufacturing process, such as
a minor change in temperature of cell culture, can change the overall characteristic of a
final biologic product.”).
21
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012).
22
See Lu, supra note 12, at 616–17.
23
See Memorandum from the Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to the Food & Drug
Admin 4 (Nov. 12, 2004), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04n0355/04n0355-c000004-01-vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ETX-BXRR] [hereinafter Pharm.
Memorandum].
24
Lu, supra note 12, at 616 n.15.
25
About Humulin R U-500, HUMULIN, http://www.humulin.com/about-U-500.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5YME-SJH8] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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Traditional small molecule drugs, are smaller, relatively simpler, and man-made.26 Small-molecule drugs are synthesized with
discrete, linear steps progressing in a predictable way, using prescribed chemicals in a known formula.27 In contrast, biologics are
larger and more complex, and their manufacturing process is less
predictable and more complicated.28 A protein’s function is dictated by its unique three-dimensional structure which is generated
as the protein is being synthesized.29 In addition, many proteins
within the cell require the placement of different types of molecules, such as sugars or fatty acids, on specific regions to function
properly.30 Thus, biologics, which are created through hundreds of
thousands of interconnected chemical reactions in complex metabolic pathways within a living cell, are very sensitive to environmental perturbations.31
The complex nature of biologics and the fact that they are produced within a living organism renders every component of the biologic important and indispensable.32 This is especially true regarding the components of the manufacturing process of biologics because it is an extremely sensitive process and may be altered by any
slight change.33 A slight alteration in a biologic’s manufacturing
process can have a drastic effect on the final product, which may
cause adverse clinical consequences.34 For example, a slight change
in the cell expressing the desired protein can affect the way it ex26

See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
Id. at 3.
28
Id.
29
Elysa B. Goldberg, Note, Fixing a Hole: Will Generic Biologics Find a Niche Within the
Hatch-Waxman Act?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 333 (2009).
30
Id.
31
Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
32
See id. at 4–5.
33
See Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM.
HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 469, 472 (2013) (“Biologics and biosimilars are sensitive to
and altered by changes in their manufacturing process.”).
34
Paul J. Declerck, Biotherapeutics in the Era of Biosimilars: What Really Matters Is
Patient Safety, 30 DRUG SAFETY 1087, 1088 (2007) (“Small distinctions in the cell line,
the manufacturing process or in any step from the cell line stage through to
administration to the patient can make a major difference in adverse effects observed
during treatment . . . .Therefore, unlike chemical pharmaceuticals, substitution between
biologics, including [follow-on biologics], can have clinical consequences and create
health concerns for patients.”).
27
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presses that protein.35 Thus, unlike small molecule drugs, biologics
are unique in that the “process is the product, and the product is
the process.”36
B. Patents on Biologics: Biologic Manufacturing Process as the
Strongest Source of Patent Protection
Due to the specific nature of biologics and its relationship with
its manufacturing process, a patent on the manufacturing process is
very important because the validity of a patent on the biologic itself
is questionable under patent law. Patents are intended to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts”37 by granting property
rights in information in exchange for full disclosure of the invention.38 A patent contains a specification and claims.39 The specification is a narrative description of the invention,40 while the claims
define the “metes and bounds” of the patent’s scope.41 A patent’s
35

Id.; Lu, supra note 12, at 625–26 (“Any minor change in the manufacture or drugdelivery process can change the overall characteristic of a final biologic product. For
example, with exactly the same manufacturing process, a manufacturer of interferon beta1a produced two batches of products with drastically different immunogenicity. One
batch was safe and effective, yet another batch caused serious immune responses. The
only difference between the two batches was the manufacture site. The manufacturing
conditions that affect the properties of biologics generally include: the cell lines used to
produce the biologics, culture/fermentation conditions, purification procedures, and
container closure/packaging systems. Thus, a much higher quality control standard is
required for biologics than for small molecule drugs.”).
36
Tam, supra note 7, at 543.
37
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (“To obtain this exclusive right, the
inventor must disclose his invention to the public. Thus, the patent also is of value to the
public because such disclosures will stimulate others to add to the sum of human
knowledge through the creation of other inventions utilizing the lessons learned by the
patentee.”); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The
patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
39
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
40
See id.
41
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
(describing the boundary of a patent as its “metes and bounds”); Festo, 234 F.3d at 622
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claims give third parties notice of the existence of the invention and
the location of the boundaries,42 but may also be used by competitors as a guide to designing around the patent.43 Thus, the precise
understanding of a patent’s claims is essential to what the patent
actually protects and in determining whether a patent has been infringed upon.
There is a separate requirement for a patent to describe the innovation the patent seeks to protect.44 This requirement is “part of
the quid pro quo of a patent; one describes an invention, and, if the
law’s other requirements are met, one obtains a patent.”45 Among
other things, the specification is required to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make or use the same innovation.46 If a person skilled
in the art must engage in “undue experimentation” to make and
use the patented invention, the patent may be found invalid for lack
of enablement.47 Additionally, “patents that claim unreproducible
(“In drafting an original claim of a patent application, the writer sets out the metes and
bounds of the invention . . . .”).
42
PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[C]laims serve the important notice function of informing the public that anyone
who makes, uses, or sells the claimed invention infringes the patent.”).
43
See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Porter, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We have
often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides for
‘designing around’ patented inventions, thus creating new innovations.”).
44
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1344. Section 112 of the Patent Act states, in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same . . . .
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
47
See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Several underlying
factual inquiries are made to determine whether the experimentation is undue or not.
These include:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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or inoperable results are . . . invalid for lack of enablement, for others skilled in the art cannot practice the invention.”48 Moreover,
failing to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to verify that what
they have made is identical to the claimed product, may invalidate
the patent.49 Thus, both the claim and specification parts of a patent require a high-level of specificity regarding the innovation and
are crucial to understanding what the patent protects and when it
has been infringed upon.
The complex nature of biologics and how they are created reveals that patents on biologics rest on “shaky ground”50 because
the requirement to enable while simultaneously claim a biologic
properly is paradoxical.51 First, the “enablement requirement
presents a unique problem for inventions that involve living materials, such as biologics products,” because in many instances it is
essentially impossible for a patent’s specification to provide an
adequate account with the comprehensive taxonomic description
necessary to enable others to make and use the biological invention.52 This specific problem may be resolved by depositing a physical sample of the invention in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) publicly accessible depositories.53 However, depositing samples in the USPTO depository does
not completely resolve the enablement issue for biologics patents
for the same reason why it is not plausible to create generic biologics, and why instead it is only plausible to create biosimilars.54 As
discussed below, it is virtually impossible for a competitor to create
a biologic that is identical to the innovator’s version.55 Theoretically, this should render most, if not all, patents on biologics invalid in
the first place because the patent has not enabled a person skilled in
the art to reproduce the claimed innovation at all, let alone without
48

Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
109, 111–12 (2011).
49
Id. at 112–13.
50
Tam, supra note 7, at 544.
51
See generally id. at 545–47 (discussing the difficulty of meeting the enablement
requirement for biologics).
52
Id. at 545.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See infra Section I.D.
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undue experimentation.56 Thus, patents on biologics rest on
“shaky ground.”57
Biologics manufacturers anticipate that others may attempt to
invalidate these seemingly questionable patents so that they can
participate in the lucrative biologics industry.58 Therefore, for security, biologics manufacturers regularly obtain separate patents
for the biologic and the manufacturing process of that biologic.59
Properly tailored process patents could be a possible solution to the
enablement problem.60 A biologic’s particular manufacturing
process is indispensable in creating that specific biologic product
without any variations.61 Any alteration or variation in that process
will inevitably most likely produce a different biologic product.62
Therefore, obtaining a patent on a biologic’s specific manufacturing process effectively protects competitors from creating that biologic.63 Thus, an important source of patent protection for biologics may be the patents on the manufacturing process of that biologic.64
Furthermore, the “product is the process”65 for biologics as
even minor manufacturing changes may critically impact the final
biologic product.66 Some, if not all, of the essential steps or tools
that are necessary to manufacture the biologic are protected by
56

See generally Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended
Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J. L. & TECH., no. 8, 2006, at 21–25
(discussing enablement law and how certain patents covering biologics will be invalid for
lack of enablement, and suggesting that any chances in enablement law should be
“narrowly limited”).
57
See generally Tam, supra note 7, at 544–47.
58
Id. at 546.
59
Id.; see also Lu, supra note 12, at 624 (“Innovator companies often rely on method
patents to protect the manufacturing process of the final products.”).
60
Tam, supra note 7, at 546.
61
See, e.g., Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-on Biologics, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 21 (2012) (“[S]mall differences in production process—or even
production by the same process but in a different facility—can result in differences in the
product, which can have adverse clinical consequences.”).
62
See id.
63
See Tam, supra note 7, at 546.
64
See id.
65
Id. at 543.
66
Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation
Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States,
35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 561 (2008).
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their own patents and other intellectual property methods.67 Thus,
it would be virtually impossible to create this biologic without the
ability to use the other steps or tools restricted by their own patent(s) because the process is integral for that specific biologic.68
For example, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (“PhRMA”), a trade group that represents the country’s
leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies,
stated that due to the “complexity of the biological manufacturing
process, extensive analytical testing is done at key process steps
using validated assays that are often proprietary, with appropriate
sample qualification to ensure that the process intermediates are
suitable for progressing to the next step.”69 Thus, the role of
process patents on the manufacturing of biologics is crucial because
it is key to manufacturing the biologic properly and may be the
source of patent protection on the biologic itself.
C. The Development, Federal Regulation, and Unaffordable Cost of
Biologics
There are strict regulations on the manufacturing and sale of
biologics.70 Biologics are regulated under the Public Health Service
Act (“PHSA”), which sets forth a strict process for approval.71 A
successful biologic begins with the biologic manufacturer’s innovation and can only enter the market after undergoing both research
and development and clinical testing.72 The pre-clinical phase of
development starts with experimentation and research, using in
vitro (in glass) and in vivo (in cells) studies,73 to discover a clinical
67

See Freilich, supra note 61, at 20–21 (“[T]he details of the production process used
by the pioneer company are protected by various intellectual property methods.”); Tam,
supra note 7, at 546.
68
See Freilich, supra note 61, at 20–21; Tam, supra note 7, at 546.
69
See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
70
See Public Health Service Act § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012); Gitter, supra note 66,
at 566; Goldberg, supra note 29, at 331–33 (discussing the various steps and tests that each
innovator drug must undergo before being introduced to the public); Ernst R. Berndt et
al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results from a Survey of
Industry and the FDA (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11425, 2005)
(providing a brief overview of the approval pathway for pharmaceutical drugs).
71
Public Health Service Act § 351.
72
See Goldberg, supra note 29, at 331.
73
See id. at 331–32; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7.
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candidate compound.74 If researchers successfully identify and purify a clinical candidate compound, they will subsequently conduct
animal studies for further testing.75 If the clinical candidate compound obtains positive results from the animal studies, the company developing the drug can file an Investigational New Drug
(“IND”) application.76 The Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) then evaluates the IND and decides whether or not to
allow the drug to be tested on humans.77 If the FDA allows the drug
to be tested on humans, then the clinical phases of testing, which
consists of three mandatory, separate phases, begins.78 Each of
these phases is designed to avert drugs that are not suitable for
general public use.79 Phase I clinical trials test for “safety and tolerability” of the drug in a small group of human subjects.80 Phase II
trials are conducted in a much larger pool of volunteers who are
diagnosed with the particular targeted condition to continue testing
for safety and tolerability, and to assess the preliminary effectiveness of the drug.81 Phase III clinical trials are conducted on the
largest pool of volunteers and are designed to evaluate the drug in a
more diverse population over a longer period of time.82 The drugs
that successfully complete these three phases can then be submitted as new Biologic License Applications (“BLAs”) to the FDA.83
The BLAs contain analytical, preclinical, and clinical data showing
that the product is safe, pure, and potent as well as elaborate discussions of the methods by which the product is manufactured.84

74

A clinical candidate compound is a chemical that provides a key breakthrough for
consequent clinical trials. See generally Franz F. Hefti, Requirements for a Lead Compound
to Become a Clinical Candidate, 9 BMC NEUROSCIENCE, Dec. 10, 2008.
75
Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7.
76
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 7.
77
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8.
78
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8.
79
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66.
80
Id. at 565; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8.
81
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 8–9.
82
Gitter, supra note 66, at 565–66; Berndt et al., supra note 70, at 9.
83
42 U.S.C. § 262(A)(2) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a) (2016); Gitter, supra note 66, at
566.
84
§ 262(A)(2)(C).
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Thus, the unique nature of biologics, their complex manufacturing processes,85 and the strict approval procedures make them
extraordinarily expensive to develop and bring to market.86 As of
December 2012, the average cost of developing a new biologic was
estimated to be approximately $1.9 billion.87 In addition, only ten
percent of approved drugs are commercially successful, and it typically takes thirteen and a half years to receive approval to market a
drug.88 Furthermore, between 2004 and 2010 only nine percent of
the drugs that entered phase I clinical trials obtained approval, and
only twenty-two percent of the biologics that reached phase II clinical trials received approval.89 This expense is passed down to the
consumer, thus making some of the most important biologics nearly unaffordable.90 The annual expense for the consumer of a biologic regimen may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.91
D. Generic Small-Molecule Drugs and the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Biosimilars as a Solution to the Unaffordable Cost of Biologics
The high costs of pharmaceuticals, including biologics, “put[s]
a great burden on the financial stability of Americans.”92 The same
85

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING
BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 5–6 (2015) (stating
that “different cell line[s], raw materials, equipment, processes, process controls, and
acceptance criteria” are all likely to affect the quality of produced biologics).
86
See Grabowski, supra note 7, at 481–82 (providing an in-depth discussion of the
unique characteristics of research and development activity and clinical testing that makes
biologics more expensive); Lu, supra note 12, at 625 (“The cost to bring a biologic drug to
the market is higher than that for a small-molecule drug. This higher cost is partly due to
the high manufacture quality required in making a biologic.”).
87
Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 473.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
See Anthony D. So & Samuel L. Katz, Opinion, Biologics Boondoggle, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/opinion/08so.html [https://
perma.cc/3368-HHKD].
91
See, e.g., Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 473 (“Herceptin can cost as much as
$100,000 annually per patient and has sales of more than $6 billion.”); So & Katz, supra
note 90 (“And those who take Cerezyme to treat Gaucher disease, a rare inherited
enzyme deficiency, spend a staggering $200,000 a year.”).
92
Felix Shin, Leaping from the “Patent Cliff” into the “Global Drug Gap”: Overcoming
Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 443–
44 (2016) (calculating proportion of gross domestic product attributable to health
expenditures, and comparing this to other countries).
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problem of unaffordable medicine faced small-molecule drugs,
which Congress resolved by enacting the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,93 better known as the HatchWaxman Act.94 By amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), the Hatch-Waxman Act permitted pharmaceutical companies to produce generic small-molecule drugs quicker
and cheaper by permitting them to piggyback off of the data of
brand-name drugs and bypass FDA testing.95 Under the HatchWaxman Act, a generic small-molecule drug does not have to undergo all of the aforementioned phases.96 Instead, the generic manufacturer is only required to show that the generic drug:
(1) contain[s] the same active ingredients as the
[brand-name small-molecule drug]
(2) [is] identical in strength, dosage form, and route
of administration
(3) [has] the same use indications
(4) is bioequivalent97 [to the brand-name smallmolecule drug]
(5) meet[s] the same batch requirements for identity, strength, purity, and quality
(6) [is] manufactured under the same strict standards of FDA’s good manufacturing practice regulations required for innovator products.98
93

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. & 35 U.S.C.).
94
E.g., Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from
Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 630 (2010).
95
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012); Ralph A. Lewis, The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL. 361,
362–63 (1984).
96
See Lewis, supra note 95, at 362.
97
§ 355(j)(8)(B). Showing bioequivalence is essentially demonstrating that the generic
drug acts the same way and has the same effect as the brand name drug. See H.R. REP.
NO. 98-857, at 31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 2647, 2664 (“A drug shall be
considered bioequivalent to a listed drug if the rate and extent of absorption of the generic
drug do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the
listed drug . . . .”); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES SUBMITTED
IN NDAS OR INDS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 2 n.4 (2014) (describing
“bioequivalence” as a statutory term under the FDCA).
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This abbreviated scheme allowed by the Hatch-Waxman Act
cuts costs and allows for cheaper generic alternatives to be introduced into the market.99 In 2009, generic non-biological drug applications typically took three to five years to assemble at a corresponding cost of $1 million to $5 million.100 The Hatch-Waxman
Act also permits consumers to choose between brand-name and
generic drugs earlier, driving down the cost of drugs by price competition.101 Overall, the Hatch-Waxman Act is generally considered
to be a success and, as a result, small-molecule drugs are relatively
more affordable.102 However, the generics solution is not directly
available for biologics.103
Indeed, it is effectively impossible to create a generic biologic.104 The generic scheme works for small-molecule drugs because
the brand-name companies have already proven that the molecule
is effective.105 Thus, as long as the generic companies are making a
drug that has the identical active ingredient and is bioequivalent,
then the generic can be presumed to be effective without the need
for extensive clinical trials. However, the physical nature of biologics and biological manufacturing renders it virtually impossible to
achieve identical composition between biologics produced by unrelated manufacturers.106 While the manufacturing process for a
98

Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm
[https://
perma.cc/3CT4-QFXV] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
99
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.
pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0809/generichatchwaxman-0809 [https://perma.cc/ZG3L-VLMA].
100
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG COMPETITION iii (2009).
101
Id. at ii.
102
See Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 57, 62 (2012) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act has been relatively successful in
creating a system that is well defined for investors, incentivizing both new drug
development and generic entry.”); Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis
of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
209, 222–23 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act has had significant success in lowering the prices
of pharmaceutical drugs.”); Rumore, supra note 99.
103
See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 59.
104
See Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
105
See Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, supra note 98.
106
Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
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small-molecule drug product typically involves only “several dozen
discrete, linear steps progressing” in a controlled and predictable
way, the “manufacturing processes for biologics are based on the
synthetic capabilities of living cells that have inherent metabolic
and synthetic variability.”107 As PhRMA explained: “Using a living
organism to produce a biological product involves hundreds to
thousands of interconnected steps in complex metabolic pathways
which are very sensitive to environmental perturbations.”108 Each
biologic manufacturing process results in a unique product where
even small alterations may cause considerable differences in the
clinical properties of the resulting biological product.109 PhRMA
asserted that “[c]hemically and pharmaceutically identical biologics will not result from unrelated manufacturers.”110 Instead, it is
possible to create biologics that are “highly similar” to each other
in that they have “no clinically meaningful differences in terms of
safety and effectiveness.”111 These macromolecules are highly
similar, but not exact—hence, the name biosimilar.112 A biosimilar
is “highly similar” to a biologic, which is referred to as the “reference product.”113
Therefore, replicating the Hatch-Waxman system for biologics
was initially believed to be impossible.114 However, in 2009, Con107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.; see also Michal Nowicki, Basic Facts About Biosimilars, 30 KIDNEY BLOOD
PRESSURE RES. 267, 268 (2007).
110
Pharm. Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
111
Information for Consumers (Biosimilars), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/ucm241718.htm
[https://perma.cc/L872-ZPLT] (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); see also Kanter & Feldman,
supra note 102, at 59 (“[T]he term ‘generic’ does not currently apply to biological drugs
copied from an original biologic. Rather, such copies are referred to as biosimilars, or
follow-on biologics.”).
112
Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 59.
113
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A), (i)(4) (2012).
114
See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 711–16 (2010); see also
Declerck, supra note 34, at 1089 (“As a consequence of the complexity of both the
biotechnology product and the production process . . . and the limitation of sensitivity of
analytical tools (i.e. the process determines the product), no solid scientific grounds exist
to guarantee safe interchangeability between any biologics . . . obtained through different
manufacturers.”).
108
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gress enacted the BPCIA, a subtitle within the larger Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which provided a streamlined
process for biosimilar approval.115
E. BPCIA
The BPCIA seeks to ensure that the biosimilars are held to a
strict and safe standard by defining a biosimilar to mean: “(A) that
the biological product is highly similar to the reference product
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components; and (B) there are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the reference product in terms of
the safety, purity, and potency of the product.”116 The statute also
requires that a biosimilar application—often referred to as “abbreviated biologic license application” (“aBLA”)117—fulfills strict data requirements.118 A biosimilar applicant must submit “analytical
studies that demonstrate that the biological product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in
clinically inactive components,” “animal studies,” and clinical
studies that are “sufficient to demonstrate safety, purity, and potency in [one] or more appropriate conditions of use . . . .”119 The
biosimilar applicant is also required to show that its biological
product uses “the same mechanism[s] of action” as the reference
product and that “the route of administration, the dosage form,
and the strength of the biological product are the same as those of
the reference product.”120 Additionally, the biosimilar applicant
must demonstrate in its aBLA that “the condition or conditions of
use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the biological product have been previously approved for

115

The key provisions of the BPCIA are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
§ 262(i)(2).
117
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder the
abbreviated pathway created by the BPCIA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k), an applicant
filing an abbreviated biologics license application (‘aBLA’ or ‘subsection (k) application’)
instead submits information to demonstrate that its product is ‘biosimilar’ to or
‘interchangeable’ with a previously approved reference product.” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 262(k)(2)–(5) (2012))), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Lu, supra note 12, at 614.
118
See § 262(k)(2).
119
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
120
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II), (IV).
116
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the reference product.”121 Furthermore, the biosimilar applicant
must demonstrate that the facility in which their biological product
is produced “meets standards designed to assure that the biological
product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.”122 If the biosimilar
applicant meets all of these requirements, as well as packaging and
labeling requirements, then the biological product may be deemed
biosimilar to the reference product.123 The BPCIA states that when
a biological product “(i) is biosimilar to the reference product; and
(ii) can be expected to produce the same clinical results as the reference product in any given patient . . .”124 it may be deemed “interchangeable” with the reference product and be substituted for
the brand name biologic by a pharmacist, even if the physician did
not prescribe the biosimilar.125
Like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA encourages generic
competition by allowing biosimilar manufacturers to piggyback off
of the clinical data of the reference biologic.126 In contrast to the
approximately $1.9 billion and thirteen and a half years it typically
takes to fully develop a biologic, it takes only seven to eight years to
develop a biosimilar at a relatively reasonable cost of $100 to $250
million.127 Additionally, “biosimilars have a better chance to make
it to market and are therefore less risky than branded biologics”
because it is easier and cheaper to copy than to innovate.128 This
allows biosimilar manufactures to enter the market at a significantly
cheaper price and thus introduce competition, making treatments
significantly more affordable.129
121

§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III).
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V).
123
§ 262(i)(2), (k).
124
§ 262(k)(4)(A).
125
§ 262(i)(3); Information for Consumers (Biosimilars), supra note 111.
126
Epstein, supra note 16, at 287; see Alsup, supra note 19, at 138–39 (“The [BPCIA]
regulates the approval of biosimilars. Borrowing from the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
BPCIA lays out an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval and market entry.”); Lu, supra
note 12, at 614–15. But see Margolis, supra note 102, at 222–36 (arguing that the BPCIA
will not succeed in lowering drug prices to the same degree that the Hatch-Waxman Act
did for generic pharmaceuticals).
127
See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 33, at 471, 473.
128
Id. at 473.
129
See Jacqueline T. Genovese, Note, Biosimilar Naming: A Call for Uniformity in a
Complex Field, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 293, 303 (2015) (“Essentially, the BPCIA creates a
shorter pathway for biosimilar approval, which in turn allows for cheaper alternatives to
122
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The BPCIA has many complex and interconnected aspects.130
One of the central aspects131 is a process in which the original biologic manufacturer (the “reference product sponsor” or “RPS”)
and biosimilar applicant exchange patents that they believe need to
be litigated.132 This patent exchange is an elaborate back-and-forth
process and has thus been dubbed the “patent dance” by practitioners.133 The first step of this procedure requires the biosimilar
applicant to provide the RPS access to the biosimilar application
itself and “such other information that describes the process or
processes used to manufacture the biological product” described in
the application “[n]ot later than [twenty] days after the Secretary134 notifies the [biosimilar] applicant that the application has
been accepted for review.”135 In addition, the applicant may in its
own discretion supply additional information that the RPS requests.136 In the next stage of the process, the RPS must give the
biosimilar applicant a list of patents for which it “believes a claim
of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the
biosimilar applicant within sixty days of receiving the application
and information.137 This list of patents includes process patents,
unlike the Hatch-Waxman Act’s litigation provisions, which exclude process patents.138 Once this is done, the dance turns to the
many life-saving biologic medicines.”). But see Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data
Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 107–10 (2016) (discussing how much cost
savings biosimilars will actually provide).
130
Carl J. Minniti III, Sandoz v. Amgen: Why Current Interpretation of the Biologic Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 Is Flawed and Jeopardizes Future Competition, 97 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 172, 177 (2015) (“The BPCIA is undoubtedly a complex
statute.”).
131
Id. at 178 (“The central feature of the BPCIA is the [p]atent [d]ance.”).
132
Lindsay Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 25
(2016).
133
Id. (“The BPCIA ‘patent dance,’ as it is colloquially referred to by patent
lawyers . . . .”).
134
42 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012) (“Unless the context otherwise requires, the term
“Secretary” means the Secretary of Health and Human Services.”).
135
Id. § 262(l)(2)(A).
136
§ 262(l)(2)(B).
137
§ 262(l)(3)(A)(i).
138
See Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-on-Biologics Law: A Section by Section
Analysis of the Patent Litigation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 234 (2010) (“The scope of the patents to be
identified in this process is broader than under the Hatch-Waxman Act, embracing not

2017]

RIDDLE OF THE MYSTERIOUS PATENT DANCE

665

biosimilar applicant who may, but need not, supply a list of additional patents that it believes could be the basis for a reasonable
claim against its biosimilar.139 Either way, the biosimilar applicant
must provide a “detailed statement” that explains why any patent
listed (by either side) is “invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed.”140 Alternatively, the biosimilar applicant may signal a
truce with respect to any particular patent by providing a statement
to the reference product sponsor that it “does not intend to begin
commercial marketing of the biological product before the date that
such patent expires.”141 The BPCIA also makes the submission of
the biosimilar application an artificial act of infringement with respect to any patent identified by either party in this list exchange
process.142 This creates federal court jurisdiction for the resolution
of the patent litigation that will ultimately follow.143
Once the biosimilar applicant has sent its statement regarding
patent validity, enforcement, and infringement, the BPCIA provides a road map for litigation of the resulting patent issues.144 In
brief, the parties identify a set of patents to be litigated immediately, leaving the rest for litigation shortly before biosimilar market
entry.145 If the RPS prevails before the end of the twelve-year exclusivity period146 on any patent in the first wave of litigation, the

only patents claiming the biological product and methods of using it, but also patents
relevant to the product’s manufacturing process.”). Compare § 262(l)(3)(A)(i) (referring
to “a list of patents for which the reference product sponsor believes a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted”), with 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012)
(requiring a generic applicant under Hatch-Waxman Act to file a certification with
respect to “each patent which claims the listed drug . . . or which claims a use for such
listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval . . .”). As explained below, the
process of manufacturing a biologic is crucial to the actual product and may be the sole
source of intellectual property protection. See infra Section II.A.
139
§ 262(l)(3)(B)(i).
140
§ 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I).
141
§ 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
142
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012).
143
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012); Alsup, supra note 19, at 141 (“This act of infringement is
considered artificial and like its counterpart under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it enables an
earlier adjudication of patent disputes and creates a justiciable case or controversy.”).
144
See § 262 (l)(4)–(6).
145
See id; Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38.
146
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2012) (“Approval of an application under this
subsection may not be made effective by the Secretary until the date that is [twelve] years
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BPCIA requires the court to enjoin infringement until the patent
expires.147 In an article discussing the BPCIA in relation to the constitutional protection of trade secrets and patents, Professor Richard Epstein predicted that “[w]here that statutory injunction
provision does not apply,” the RPS will “presumably seek an injunction,” and damages, “if the biosimilar has been approved and
marketed.”148
F. Amgen v. Sandoz
In one of the first instances of the application of the BPCIA, the
biosimilar applicant refused to initiate the patent dance. In 1991,
the FDA approved Amgen, Inc.’s biologic filgrastim under the
trade name Neupogen to reduce the risk of infection in patients
undergoing chemotherapy.149 Sandoz, Inc. developed its own filgrastim product, a close copy of Neupogen called EP2006, under
the trade names Zarzio and Zarxio.150 Sandoz began marketing Zarzio outside the United States in 2009, and launched Zarxio in the
United States in September 2015.151
On July 7, 2014, Sandoz received notice that the FDA accepted
its application for Zarzio, making it the first ever application for a
biosimilar to be accepted by the FDA.152 As stated above, the first
after the date on which the reference product was first licensed under subsection (a).”);
Dougherty, supra note 138, at 233 n.14.
147
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(D) (2012).
148
Epstein, supra note 16, at 318.
149
Andrew Pollack, An F.D.A. Approval for Amgen, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 1991), http://
www.nytimes.com/1991/02/22/business/an-fda-approval-for-amgen.html
[https://
perma.cc/QB4Y-FZQN].
150
Press Release, Novartis, Sandoz Launches Zarxio (Filgrastim-Sndz), the First
Biosimilar in the United States, NOVARTIS (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.novartis.com/
news/media-releases/sandoz-launches-zarxiotm-filgrastim-sndz-first-biosimilar-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/C5SJ-VP4V]; see also Press Release, Sandoz, Zarzio Overtakes
Neupogen and Granocyte to Become Most Prescribed Daily G-CSF in Europe (July 22,
2013),
http://www.evaluategroup.com/Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id=444283
[https://perma.cc/N5JL-8CKT]; Sabrina Tavernise, For First Time, F.D.A. Panel
Approves Generic Copy of Costly Biologic Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/01/08/science/fda-panel-vote-biologics.html
[https://perma.cc/
G42K-BPY6].
151
Press Release, Novartis, supra note 150; Tavernise, supra note 150.
152
See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *1, *3
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Tavernise supra note 150.
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step of the patent dance is to supply the stipulated information no
later than twenty days after the “Secretary notifies the [biosimilar]
applicant that the application has been accepted for review.”153
However, Sandoz chose not to comply with the BPCIA’s disclosure and negotiation procedures, taking the position that initiating
the patent dance is optional.154 Sandoz proposed an alternative arrangement—namely, that Amgen could “procure information via
an infringement action.”155 Amgen brought suit in the Northern
District of California on October 24, 2014.156 Nevertheless, on
March 6, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz’s filgrastim under the
BPCIA, making it the first biosimilar approved and marketed in the
United States.157
On March 19, 2015, the district court sided with Sandoz on the
patent dance issue, holding that the patent dance outlined by the
BPCIA is optional and at the discretion of the biosimilar applicant.158 Amgen appealed to the Federal Circuit, which issued a
fractured decision on July 21, 2015.159 Two judges on the panel,
Judges Lourie and Chen, found that the patent dance procedures
under paragraph (l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA were optional and at the
discretion of the biosimilar applicant, affirming the district court’s
decision on this aspect and siding with Sandoz.160
Ultimately, Sandoz filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court on a related issue,161 and Amgen filed a conditional cross-petition asking the Court to evaluate whether the pa153

42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012).
Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *3, *5.
155
Id. at *3.
156
Id. at *4.
157
See Press Release, Novartis, supra note 150.
158
Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6.
159
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 808 (2017).
160
Id. at 1357 (majority opinion); id. at 1367 (Chen, J., dissenting in part). But see id. at
1362 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that he does not share in
the court’s opinion, which includes the portion of the decision finding the biosimilar
manufacture is required to disclose pursuant to paragraph (l)(2)(A)).
161
Sandoz’s petition asked the Court to look at the issue of whether the clock on section
262(l)(8)(A)’s commercial marketing notice requirement, which requires the biosimilar
applicant to give the RPS 180 days’ notice, starts before or after FDA approves the
biosimilar. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 151039 (U.S. May 17, 2016).
154
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tent dance was mandatory.162 On June 20, 2016, instead of deciding
whether to grant certiorari on the patent dance dispute between
Amgen and Sandoz, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief in the case expressing the views of the United
States.163 In response, the acting Solicitor General recommended
that the court review the Federal Circuit’s decision because the
questions presented are “sufficiently important to merit the
Court’s review” and “[b]iologic medicines are among the most
important pharmaceuticals available today.”164 On January 13,
2017, the Supreme Court granted Sandoz’s petition and Amgen’s
conditional cross-petition.165 The Supreme Court will hear arguments in April 2017 and may issue a decision by the end of June.166
It is imperative that the nature of the BPCIA’s patent dance is
decided correctly. The pharmaceutical industry must make critical
choices on where to allocate their spending and direct their research and development of medicine that people desperately need.
The decision on this issue will most likely influence how the pharmaceutical companies make that determination. Thus, the decision
will affect many.

162

Opposition to the Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Amgen
Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 15-1195 (U.S. May 17, 2016).
163
Nathan Monroe-Yavneh & Aron Fischer, Supreme Court Asks Solicitor General to
Weigh in on Amgen v. Sandoz, BIOLOGICS BLOG (June 20, 2016), http://
www.biologicsblog.com/blog/supreme-court-asks-solicitor-general-weigh-amgen-vsandoz/ [https://perma.cc/7RWP-63L8].
164
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., Nos. 151039, 15-1195 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2016); see also John T. Aquino, High Court Likely to Review
Biosimilars Case After Solicitor General Brief, BNA: LIFE SCI. L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Dec. 9,
2016),
https://www.bna.com/high-court-likely-n73014448341/
[https://perma.cc/
9KWG-KD9C].
165
John T. Aquino, Supreme Court Grabs Chance to Clarify Biosimilar Law, BNA: LIFE
SCI. L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bna.com/supreme-court-grabsn73014449884/ [https://perma.cc/4EW6-TBHR].
166
Id.

2017]

RIDDLE OF THE MYSTERIOUS PATENT DANCE

669

II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION TO MAKE THE PATENT
DANCE MANDATORY OR OPTIONAL
Statutory interpretation may be used to analyze whether the patent dance was meant to be mandatory or optional,167 but that analysis is outside the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note discusses
the purpose the patent dance purports to serve, and its role in the
overall scheme of the BPCIA. This Part discusses several key implications168 that result as a consequence of the patent dance being
optional versus mandatory, and vice versa.169 Section II.A notes
some of the implications that a mandatory or optional patent dance
would have on patent infringement disputes and the effect it would
have on the overall scheme of the BPCIA. Section II.B discusses
how the decision of whether the patent dance is mandatory or optional will determine whether the biosimilar applicants manufacturing information is shared upfront or not.
A. Consequences of the BPCIA Scheme and the Effect on Both BrandName Biologics Manufacturers and Biosimilar Manufacturers
If the patent dance is mandatory, then the sequence of events
that follow an FDA approval of a biosimilar application is clear and
predetermined: the biosimilar applicant must initiate and complete
the strict patent dance process.170 However, if the patent dance is
optional, then the sequence of events that follows the FDA approval of a biosimilar application is more difficult to predict.171 Under
the view that the patent dance is optional, the BPCIA allows two
scenarios: “(1) the sharing of the biosimilar application and manufacturing information, in order to initiate the [p]atent [d]ance, or
167

See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354–59 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing
and ultimately deciding this issue based on statutory interpretation), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 808 (2017).
168
There are many important implications; however, this Note focuses on the
implications that result from the effects that a mandatory or optional patent dance has on
patent infringement disputes.
169
The Federal Circuit’s decision focused on the statutory interpretation issues to
determine whether the patent dance is optional or mandatory. It is true that there is a
clear statutory interpretation question here, but this Note focuses on the policy choices
based on the consequences of this important decision.
170
See Carl J. Minniti III, Biosimilar Litigation: The Tussle Over How to Resolve Biologic
Patents, 11 SCITECH LAWYER, no. 3, 2015, at 16, 17.
171
See id. at 19.
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(2) the refusal to share this information, thereby requiring the RPS
to file an immediate declaratory judgment [law]suit” or resort to
traditional patent infringement litigation.172
Thus, a clear difference is immediately apparent: A mandatory
patent dance ensures that the patent dance will occur and will be
the method to resolve patent infringement disputes between the
RPS and the biosimilar applicant. On the other hand, an optional
patent dance creates a system in which the biosimilar applicant has
the advantage of choosing how to proceed and may opt out of the
patent dance entirely. The difference in these two systems creates
several critical implications.
1. Certainty for Both Brand Name Biologic and Biosimilar
Manufacturers
The first apparent implication involves the level of certainty. A
system where the patent dance is mandatory enables the patent infringement resolution process to be more certain and predictable
for both brand name biologic and biosimilar manufacturers.173 Both
parties would know that, when a biosimilar applicant gets a biosimilar application approved, the next move is to follow the step-bystep process of the patent dance; thus, both parties would be able
to prepare accordingly.174 Although, in this system, neither party
would seem to have any strategic advantage over the other, they
both would have the benefit of knowing how the other party must
conduct themselves.175 There may of course be specific facts and
circumstances that make opting out of the patent dance the better
172

Id.; see also Alsup, supra note 19, at 154 (“These subparagraphs allow the reference
product sponsor to commence patent litigation immediately following the wrong move,
removing availability to the applicant of a litigation safe harbor.”).
173
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317 (“This brings certainty to the biosimilar applicants
(indeed, a risk-free opportunity to determine whether they may market their products),
but it also allows the innovator to avoid multi-year patent litigation proceedings while an
infringing biosimilar product is eroding its market share.”). But see Kanter & Feldman,
supra note 102, at 77 (discussing how the disclosure requirements of the patent dance are
unclear).
174
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317–19 (outlining the patent dance and concluding that
the statutory sequence “makes good sense”).
175
See id. at 319 (“The whole point of the system is to induce rapid and reliable
exchange of relevant information in order to reduce the various risks on both sides of the
transaction.”).
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option for a biosimilar manufacturer, as was the case for Sandoz in
the case currently facing the Supreme Court;176 however, for biosimilar manufacturers in general, a mandatory patent dance would
provide certainty from the onset.177 This certainty could be a valuable asset for biosimilar manufacturers who must make significant
decisions on how to allocate their resources and how to market
their products.178
An optional patent dance, on the other hand, would create a
system where there is significantly less certainty.179 In a system
where the patent dance is optional, biosimilar manufacturers have
two options and may choose to proceed with the option that best
fits their current needs and circumstances.180 Even though there
are only two options, the RPS would not have any way of knowing
which option the biosimilar applicant will choose as it would presumably be dependent on private facts of the biosimilar manufacturer’s specific circumstances.181
2. Strategic Options for the Biosimilar Applicant
A second important implication concerns the strategic options
available to the biosimilar applicant. If the patent dance was mandatory, the biosimilar applicant would be required to initiate the
patent dance within the twenty-day period.182 However, an optional patent dance would provide the biosimilar applicant with more
advantageous strategic options.183 Under an optional regime, the
biosimilar applicant may choose how they would like to proceed in
a way that best fits their current needs and circumstances because
the decision of whether to initiate the patent dance rests entirely in
the hands of the biosimilar applicant.184 In other words, the biosi176

Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 808 (2017).
177
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317.
178
See Amgen, 794 F.3d at 1363; WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33901, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INNOVATION ISSUES 13 (2009); Epstein, supra note 16, at 317.
179
See sources cited supra note 178.
180
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
181
See id.
182
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012).
183
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
184
See id.
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milar applicant would have the sole ability to decide how it wishes
to proceed, and the RPS would simply have to wait until the end of
the twenty-day period in which the BPCIA allows for the biosimilar
applicant to provide the listed information and thus initiate the patent dance.185 The RPS would need to wait until the end of that period to determine its next step.186 If the biosimilar applicant provides the RPS with the necessary information, then the patent
dance initiates and the RPS would need to follow it.187 However, if
the period lapses and the RPS has not received the prescribed information, then the RPS must file a patent infringement claim to
protect the patents it believes the biosimilar applicant is infringing
upon.188
3. Comparing the Patent Dance to Traditional Patent
Infringement Litigation
Another critical implication stems from the difference between
the patent dance and traditional patent infringement litigation.189
Under a mandatory patent dance system, patent infringement disputes between the RPS and the biosimilar applicant must be resolved through the patent dance.190 However, under an optional
patent dance system where the biosimilar applicant has opted out
of the patent dance, the RPS must rely on traditional patent infringement litigation.191 One of the key distinctions between the
patent dance and traditional patent infringement litigation is the
efficiency of the patent dance over the potential expediency of an
immediate patent infringement lawsuit.192
185

See id.; see also § 262(l)(2)(A).
See § 262(l)(2)–(3) (showing that the RPS acts upon receipt of the biosimilar’s
information); see also Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
187
See § 262(l)(3).
188
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012); see also Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
189
It is beyond the scope of this Note to explain every difference between the patent
dance and traditional patent infringement litigation, so this Section instead focuses on the
differences in the overall process with regard to manufacturing information.
190
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 17.
191
See § 271(e)(2)(C).
192
See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6–7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (pointing out that section 262(l) “lays out a process that could take up
to 230 days—just to commence patent litigation”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017); Minniti, supra note 170, at 24–
25 (“Ultimately, the tension between biosimilar makers and reference product sponsors is
186
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Complying with the patent dance establishes an efficient
process in which patent disputes can be resolved.193 Once the patent dance is complete, the BPCIA requires the RPS and biosimilar
application to engage in “good faith negotiations” regarding the
disputed patents.194 The BPCIA forces both sides to compromise
and agree on a list of specific patents to be litigated immediately.195
The remaining patents can only be litigated later.196 This process is
intended to guarantee that the patent infringement disputes will be
resolved efficiently by ensuring that only the most pertinent patents are litigated immediately.197 Furthermore, the prescribed negotiation requires that both parties provide explanations for their
actions at several points during the patent dance’s negotiation,
creating transparency as to what the points of contention will be
when the patents are ultimately litigated.198
Additionally, the patent dance prescribes specific deadlines for
each of its parts ensuring that the exchanges and negotiations run
efficiently and that the actual litigation of the agreed upon patents
occurs within a given time.199 The patent dances provides a more
efficient process for the specific biologic and corresponding biosimilar because the patents that are necessary to determine how to
proceed are identified early on.200 Although actual litigation may be
delayed, relative to traditional patent litigation, both parties will
one of timing and disclosure. On the one hand, biosimilar makers want patent disputes
resolved expediently to instill confidence in their investment, but do not want to share
manufacturing information. On the other hand, reference product sponsors want patent
disputes resolved methodically to delay the potential invalidation of their patents.”).
193
See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–36 (providing a detailed analysis of the
provisions comprising the patent dance).
194
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A) (2012); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237.
195
See § 262(l)(4)(A); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38 (“The patent resolution
procedure begins with the applicant choosing a number of patents to be litigated. This
step does not involve the identification of specific patents. Rather, it is only the
applicant’s choice of how many patents should be litigated, e.g., one patent, two patents,
etc. Within five days after the applicant chooses this number, the parties simultaneously
exchange lists that identify the specific patents that each wants to litigate.”).
196
See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77 (“This process provides for initial
litigation over essential patents and permits subsequent litigation or court action on the
remaining patents only after resolution of that initial [law]suit.”).
197
See id. at 77–78.
198
See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–38.
199
See § 262(l)(2)–(8) (providing a timeline for each step of the patent dance).
200
See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77.
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know approximately when the litigation will occur201 and what it
will encompass.202 This allows both parties to prepare accordingly,
ensuring an overall efficient process.203
This efficiency benefits both parties. The RPS benefits by litigating the patents it deems the most pertinent and strongest first,
and any other patents later.204 If the RPS wins at either of the stages, it may be awarded an injunction.205 Thus, the patent dance
grants the RPS an efficient method in which to deliver its strongest
swipe at the biosimilar applicant, while guaranteeing that it can
fight on the other patents (if applicable) should the RPS lose.206 In
contrast, under traditional patent litigation, the RPS may need to
fight all the patents at once.207
The biosimilar applicant also benefits because the patent dance
“allows the applicant to preview which patents the [RPS] believes
are valid and infringed, assess related factual and legal support, and
exercise some control over which patents are litigated and
when.”208 Additionally, the biosimilar applicant has the benefit of
being “able to undergo the [patent dance’s] information exchange
while protected by the statute’s safe harbor from litigation.”209 A
201

Cf. § 262(l); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–39. Each step of the BPCIA’s patent
dance provides a deadline; thus, litigation of the agreed upon patents must occur within
the culmination of all of the deadlines. See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–39.
202
See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38.
203
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 319 (“The whole point of the system is to induce rapid
and reliable exchange of relevant information in order to reduce the various risks on both
sides of the transaction.”).
204
See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77–78 (“The reference product sponsor
must first provide a list of patents that it believes it can assert against the biosimilar
applicant.”). But see Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237–38 (explaining that the biosimilar
applicant chooses, and the RPS must comply with, the number of patents to litigate if the
parties do not agree on which patents should be litigated).
205
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2012); Dougherty, supra note 138, at 234.
206
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 318.
207
See Alsup, supra note 19, at 143–44 (“Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of subsection (l)
establish a two-phase litigation process that represents a radical departure from traditional
patent litigation.”).
208
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 808 (2017).
209
Id. But see Alsup, supra note 19, at 154 (“These subparagraphs allow the reference
product sponsor to commence patent litigation immediately following the wrong move,
removing availability to the applicant of a litigation safe harbor.”).
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biosimilar applicant with a high or unknown risk of liability for infringement may find this “carrot of a safe harbor”210 particularly
advantageous because, otherwise, the applicant would remain vulnerable to risky patent infringement lawsuits.211 And, if necessary,
the biosimilar applicant could “delay its product launch to protect
the investment it made in developing its biosimilar.”212
However, the efficiency of the patent dance comes at the cost
of time and expediency. The process could take up to 230 days to
commence patent litigation.213 Comparatively, traditional patent
infringement does not entail the same pre-ligation negotiations or
communications and thus can provide a potentially more expedient
process.214 To some, this expediency may be more valuable than
the efficiency delays provided by the patent dance.215 For example,
the efficiency of the patent dance may be outweighed by the disadvantage of unnecessary delay to a biosimilar “applicant who values
expedience over risk mitigation.”216 A biosimilar applicant may
confidently believe in good faith that there are no relevant unexpired patents that its biosimilar infringe upon, and “that it is likely
to prevail if challenged with an infringement [claim].”217 The applicant may, in such an instance, wish to waive the efficiency and
benefits that the patent dance provides, “and instead commence
litigation immediately.”218
Thus, the potential for expediency that an optional patent
dance provides may be a tremendous benefit to the biosimilar applicant in certain circumstances. The only apparent benefit the
RPS would gain under an optional patent dance regime is the lack
of strict restrictions and constraints that the patent dance would
have instigated, such as the safe harbor.219
210

Amgen, 2015 WL 1264756, at *6.
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id. at *7.
214
See id. at *6–7 (noting that Sandoz’s decision not to comply with the patent dance
led Amgen to file a patent infringement lawsuit sooner than if it had complied with the
patent dance).
215
See id.
216
Id. at *7.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at *6; Alsup, supra note 19, at 154.
211
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B. Implications of Sharing the Biosimilar Applicant’s Application and
Manufacturing Information
Another crucial implication of the decision to make the patent
dance mandatory or option is that, under the patent dance, the biosimilar applicant is required to share information that would not be
shared in traditional patent infringement lawsuits.220 Under the
first step of the patent dance, the biosimilar applicant must share a
copy of the application with the RPS.221 If the biosimilar applicant
decided to opt out of the patent dance, it would not be obligated to
disclose that information, and the RPS may be entirely unaware of
the application because the FDA cannot disclose filings.222 The
first step of the patent dance also requires the biosimilar applicant
to share information regarding the manufacturing processes of the
biosimilar.223 This unique aspect of the patent dance,224 if adhered
to, ensures that the RPS will know potential trade secret information regarding the process, or processes, used to manufacture the
biosimilar in question.225 Comparatively, under traditional patent
infringement litigation, there is no requirement for a party to share
this information.226 Thus, the information-sharing steps of the patent dance give the RPS a significant advantage because it can use
the information provided to determine whether the biosimilar applicant infringes on any RPS manufacturing patents issued for its
original biologic.227
220

The biosimilar applicant must share a copy of the application that it submitted to the
FDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). The biosimilar applicant must also share
“such other information that describes the process or processes used to manufacture the
biological product that is the subject of such application.” Id.
221
Id.
222
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 289–90; Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“Moreover,
because FDA cannot disclose subsection (k) filings, the RPS could be placed in the
difficult position of not even knowing an application has been filed for a drug that could
undercut its sales, if the biosimilar applicant does not disclose that information.”).
223
§ 262(l)(2)(A).
224
See Dougherty, supra note 138, at 234 (“The scope of the patents to be identified in
this process is broader than under the Hatch-Waxman Act, embracing not only patents
claiming the biological product and methods of using it, but also patents relevant to the
product’s manufacturing process.”).
225
Epstein, supra note 16, at 317.
226
See id. at 319; Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
227
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“Under the [patent dance], the biosimilar
applicant must provide a copy of its application and manufacturing process information to
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To adequately plead a claim of patent infringement, a patent
holder must state plausible factual allegations based on information
that is sufficient to state a claim that a product infringes its patent.228 Competitors rarely have access to each other’s confidential
manufacturing processes before litigation.229 If the biosimilar applicant does not share its manufacturing information with the RPS,
then litigation of the process patents on the method of manufacturing its biologic is significantly more complicated because the RPS
typically has no way of knowing the methods that the biosimilar
applicant uses to manufacture the biosimilar.230 The RPS will typically “not be privy to the manufacturing processes used by the biosimilar applicant and[,] therefore, may be unable to determine
whether any of its manufacturing patents are infringed.”231 Thus, it
would be significantly more difficult for a RPS to sufficiently state a
claim, based on plausible factual allegations, that the biosimilar applicant infringes on its process patents.232 Additionally, the patent
holder itself assumes the risk that it will be challenged on validity
grounds each time it enters litigation because there is no guarantee
that a patent will be found to be valid.233 Therefore, if there is no
probable patent infringement, the patent holder would likely not
want to litigate due to the risk that the patent may be invalidated.234
If the RPS does not have information about manufacturing, it

the RPS, enabling the RPS to assess whether its patents may be infringed by commercial
marketing of the biosimilar.”).
228
See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (discussing
pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss in the context of a patent litigation
lawsuit).
229
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
233
See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 967 F.2d 1571, 1573 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1992) rev’d on other grounds, 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (“It is arguable that a counterclaim for
invalidity of asserted claims is even mandatory . . . .”).
234
See Roger A. Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71,
90–91 (2013) (“And patent holders are, of course, happy to collect licensing revenue and
are likely willing to discount their royalties to avoid the risk of an invalidity judgment.”).
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would not be able to make an accurate decision whether or not to
enter litigation and risk the validity of its patent.235
Ultimately, the RPS may find confidential “relevant product
information” regarding the biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing
processes through discovery.236 However, compiling sufficient factual matter to make a plausible claim can be—and usually is—very
time-consuming and expensive.237 Moreover, it is possible that, despite lengthy discovery, the patent holder may not actually find sufficient information regarding the alleged infringing manufacturing
process to be able to show a plausible claim of infringement, even
though the process is in fact infringing on the patent.238 This may
be especially true with biologics because of their complex, and not
yet fully understood, nature and manufacturing process.239 As discussed above, the complex manufacturing process of biologics occurs within a living cell, and therefore it may be nearly impossible
to determine the specific manufacturing process that a competitor
used to manufacture a biologic or biosimilar if the information is
not shared.240 Thus, under an optional patent dance regime, bringing a viable claim for the infringement of one or more of process
patents may be complex and costly for the RPS.
In contrast, under the patent dance’s procedures, all pertinent
information must be shared.241 Therefore, the RPS will know
whether the biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing process potentially infringes its process patents, and it will be easier to show a

235

Some may argue that this point is not compelling on the basis that the RPS may not
deserve much sympathy in this scenario because, if their patents are invalid, then there is
no reason why they should be allowed to keep them.
236
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 322.
237
Attorneys’ View of Discovery Problems, 15 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 132 (1997) (“A
survey of attorneys released last month shows that discovery is expensive and full of
problems—but attorneys seem to accept that as normal.”).
238
See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (“[Under an optional patent dance regime and
where the biosimilar applicant refuses to share the required information], the RPS will not
be privy to the manufacturing processes used by the biosimilar applicant and therefore,
may be unable to determine whether any of its manufacturing patents are infringed.”)
239
See supra Section I.A.
240
See Pharm Memorandum, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing how each manufacturer has
different standards and tests, which are developed based on each product).
241
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012).
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plausible claim of infringement, if applicable.242 This divergence
demonstrates a key difference, and thus consequence, between
rendering the patent dance optional versus mandatory. If the patent dance is mandatory, then the path is clear: The biosimilar applicant must share information regarding its manufacturing process
within twenty days of acceptance for review,243 ensuring that the
RPS will ultimately know whether its manufacturing patents are
being infringed or not. This cuts a large amount of time away from
the patent litigation.244 On the other hand, if the patent dance is
optional, the path forward can be complicated and expensive.
III. THE PATENT DANCE SHOULD BE MANDATORY
This Part weighs the aforementioned implications and concludes that the patent dance of the BPCIA should be mandatory.
Section III.A discusses the importance of the BPCIA’s aim to balance its countervailing goals of incentivizing innovation of new biologics while trying to make these biologics affordable. Section
III.B then discusses how the implications outlined in Part II of this
Note require a mandatory patent dance to ensure that the BPCIA’s
balance is maintained. The Part concludes by arguing that the patent dance should be mandatory because the fundamental role of a
biologic’s manufacturing processes requires that the manufacturing
information be shared from the onset, which can only be ensured if
the patent dance is mandatory.
A. A Mandatory Patent Dance Is Essential to Maintaining the
Balance of the BPCIA’s Goals
The BPCIA lies at the intersection of two complex bodies of
law: patent law and pharmaceutical regulation.245 Additionally, it
walks the thin line between incentivizing innovation of new biologics while simultaneously trying to make these biologics afforda242

See Minniti, supra note 170, at 19 (noting that in a mandatory patent dance regime,
the RPS will be able to “assess whether its patents may be infringed”).
243
§ 262(l)(2)(A).
244
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 14-CV-04741-RS, 2015 WL 1264756, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 808 (2017).
245
See Goldberg, supra note 29, at 352, 356; Tam, supra note 7, at 537–38, 564–65.
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ble.246 These two goals are countervailing. If the process to allow
biosimilars is too easy and favors the biosimilar manufacturers, the
brand name biologics manufacturers may lose the incentive to allocate their resources to innovation of new essential biologics.247 On
the other hand, if the protection is too strong, and it is too difficult
to bring competing biosimilars to the market, the BPCIA may fail
to bring down prices as intended.248
The legislative history shows that both biologic and biosimilar
manufacturers were heavily involved in how the BPCIA was structured.249 It is clear that the final product was a negotiated compromise that took both sides into account.250 The compromise recognizes the complexity and difficulty of the countervailing goals that
influenced the particular formation of the BPCIA as a whole.251 To
combat that complexity, both parties compromised and agreed on a
system that provides clarity and transparency so that the only remaining issue is the subject matter itself.252 Thus, all of the
BPCIA’s components were presumably intended to execute that
theme—each aspect of the BPCIA was intended to achieve com246

See Epstein, supra note 16, at 286 (“This statute, like the Hatch-Waxman Act before
it, is intended to balance twin goals that are necessarily in some tension.”); Lu, supra note
12, at 650 (“[T]he central mission of the BPCIA is to balance two competing interests:
innovation and accessibility.”); Tam, supra note 7, at 540 (“The resulting statute
balances the interests of the pioneer drug industry, the generic drug industry, and patients
seeking access to the best available medicines.”).
247
John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec, Exploration of Potential Economics
of Follow-on Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 56 (2010) (“Inadequate incentives would likely diminish the
economic attractiveness of undertaking new biotech [research and development] and
investment in this sector.”).
248
See Margolis, supra note 102, at 212–13.
249
See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 816–18 (2010); Epstein,
supra note 16, at 315 (“[T]he Biosimilars Act . . . was the subject of extensive four-year
negotiations between the innovator and generic industry (both of which are sophisticated
and well-informed).”).
250
Carver et al., supra note 249, at 817 (“[T]he final decisions on key issues were the
subject of bipartisan agreement and represented a middle ground between innovator and
generic interests.”).
251
Id.
252
Id. at 776 (“[The Federal Trade Commission] added that [a] system of premarketing
patent litigation that is simple and transparent is less likely to result in competitive
harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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plete clarity and transparency to the furthest extent possible.253 It is
this understanding that must inform the decision on every aspect of
the BPCIA, including the patent dance.
The implications outlined in Part II show that the patent dance
must be mandatory. The efficiency and transparency that the patent dance ensures was a crucial aspect of the compromise and is
essential to maintaining the BPCIA’s balance. Additionally, making
the patent dance optional would significantly favor the biosimilar
applicants, and these systematic implications would skew the balance and prevent the BPCIA from achieving its countervailing
goals.254 Therefore, the patent dance should be mandatory.
B. The Patent Dance Should Be Mandatory Because It Is Better for the
BPCIA’s Purpose and Scheme
As part of Congress’ efforts to balance the goals of competition
and innovation, the BPCIA contains an extensive, integrated
framework for the resolution of patent disputes between a biosimilar applicant and an RPS.255 However, what Congress intended by
including the patent dance and what its exact role was intended to
be is disputed: Did Congress intend the patent dance to be an efficient process or an expedient one?
1. Efficiency Is the Key to the Patent Dance and Is Crucial to
the BPCIA’s Balance
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended the
BPCIA to provide an efficient process in which biosimilars could be
approved while maintaining a delicate balance.256 In a congressional
hearing, Representative Anna Eshoo of California noted that the
purpose of the patent dance was “to ensure that litigation surrounding relevant patents will be resolved expeditiously and prior to
the launch of the biosimilar product, providing certainty to the applicant, the reference product manufacturer, and the public at
253

See id. at 776, 817.
See supra Section III.A.
255
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A) (2012); see also Dougherty, supra note 138, at 237.
256
See Minniti, supra note 130, at 184–85 (citing Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing
Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 196 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Teresa Stanek Rea, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association)).
254

682

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:645

large.”257 Indeed, as Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit noted in
his opinion in Amgen, one of the goals of the BPCIA was an “efficient resolution of patent issues.”258 Additionally, in a brief supporting Sandoz’s petition for certiorari, several biosimilar manufacturers explained: “To resolve such patent rights efficiently, subsection (l) of the statute, entitled ‘Patents,’ outlines a step-by-step
process to determine when litigation as to particular patents may be
filed.”259 However, Sandoz and the biosimilar industry seek to take
it one step further by arguing that, essentially, the BPCIA gives
them the option to choose the efficient “step-by-step process”260
or opt out if expediency is more advantageous for their particular
circumstances.261 Although the legislative history is silent on
whether the BPCIA could allow the biosimilar applicant to choose
how to proceed, it suggests that the patent dance was intended to
ensure that an efficient process was utilized to resolve necessary
patent infringement disputes.262 Therefore, the patent dance must
be mandatory in order to maintain the scheme so that the balance is
not skewed.
The designated exchange of information is fundamental to the
BPCIA’s purpose of efficient resolution of patent issues because
the exchange was part of the compromise between the two sides,
and it helps maintain the BPCIA’s balance of its countervailing

257

Hearing, supra note 256, at 9 (statement of Rep. Anna G. Eshoo) (emphasis added).
At the time, Rep. Eshoo served on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and on
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Id. at 7. She also co-chaired the
Congressional High-Tech Caucus and the House Medical Technology Caucus, and
served as Vice Chair of the 21st Century Health Care Caucus. Id.
258
Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017).
259
Brief for Hospira, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Certiorari
at 4, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. No. 15–1039 (U.S. Jan 13, 2017) (No. 15-1039)
(emphasis added).
260
Id.
261
See id.; Amgen, 794 F.3d at 1353; Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS,
2015 WL 1264756, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017) (“Sandoz sent Amgen a second
letter on July 25 again offering conditional access to its BLA. It also asserted therein that
the BPCIA entitled it to opt out of subsection (l )’s procedures, and that Amgen could
instead procure information via an infringement action.”).
262
See sources cited supra notes 256–57.
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goals.263 The BPCIA, including the patent dance scheme, was the
subject of lengthy negotiations.264 Thus, the BPCIA, as enacted,
represents a compromise in which each aspect was intended to
maintain the balance.265 It is “clear that a meaningful exchange of
information is critical to both sides if they are to be able to litigate
patent infringement issues before biosimilar market entry.”266 Although there is debate as to whether patents increase innovation or
not, it is generally accepted that for the pharmaceutical industry
there would be no innovation if the pharmaceutical industry did not
believe that their product had enough protection to be able to turn
a profit.267
As noted above, the cost to properly bring a drug to the market
is astronomically expensive.268 Additionally, pharmaceutical industries must recoup losses sustained when certain drugs do not pass
the research and development stage, or any of the FDA-required
clinical phases, even though they have already expended millions, if
not billions of dollars.269 It is clear that brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers require patent protection to incentivize innovation.270 Thus, for the BPCIA to succeed, it is imperative that nei263

See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 816 (“[T]he nature of (and even advisability of)
the patent litigation process [was] thoroughly debated years before enactment of the
legislation.”).
264
See id. (“[T]he BPCIA was enacted after many years of stakeholder discussions—
within the industry, at the agency, through citizen petition dockets, in journals, in
legislative hearings, in markups, and on the Hill more generally—of, as far as the authors
can tell, every key scientific and policy issue that needed to be addressed. Every provision
of the final legislation—from the clinical trial requirements to the data exclusivity term—
had been publicly vetted for at least several years, and consensus on some points (such as
the need for case by case determinations of the data requirements) had been evident for
the better part of a decade.”); Epstein, supra note 16, at 315 (“[T]he Biosimilars Act . . .
was the subject of extensive four-year negotiations between the innovator and generic
industry (both of which are sophisticated and well-informed).”).
265
Carver et al., supra note 249, at 817 (“[T]he BPCIA represented a meaningful
compromise between biosimilar industry and innovator industry interests.”).
266
Epstein, supra note 16, at 319.
267
See Vernon et al., supra note 247, at 56.
268
See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
269
See Grabowski, supra note 7, at 486.
270
Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and
Medical Innovations, AAPS J., Aug. 3, 2007, at E312, E315 (“The uncertainties associated
with the development of pharmaceuticals are many and substantial. Maximizing the
certainty that a research-based manufacturer can obtain, enforce, defend, and make full,
legitimate use of IP rights is essential to maintaining the cycle of innovation for the benefit
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ther side be allowed to unilaterally subvert the patent dance.271 The
patent dance was structured to ensure an efficient process in which
patent litigation can be deliberated early on.272 This efficiency is
crucial for the BPCIA. As Richard Epstein explains in his article
discussing the constitutional protection affected by the BPCIA,
“[s]haring the information prescribed in the patent dance in confidence gives the RPS an opportunity to voice its view about any potential conflicts, at a point early enough in the process that the remainder of the dispute can be resolved in an orderly fashion under
the well-articulated statutory procedures.”273
In this regard, and many others, complying with the patent
dance is more efficient and effective than noncompliance. There
may be times when it would be strategically advantageous for the
biosimilar applicant to elect not to use the patent dance, but this
complexity and lack of transparency is exactly what the BPCIA is
trying to prevent.274 One of the countervailing goals of the BPCIA
was to maintain the incentive to innovate.275 However, lengthy intellectual property litigation and the increased uncertainty that an
optional patent dance causes would negatively impact innovation.276
Additionally, as compared to the BPCIA, the Hatch-Waxman
Act has a distinctly different process by which patent infringement
disputes are resolved.277 The abbreviated pathway under the
of the public health. In the absence of strong IP rights at each stage of the innovation
cycle, the promise of pharmaceutical innovation could be lost.”).
271
See Epstein, supra note 16, at 319.
272
42 U.S.C. § 242(l)(2) (2012); see Kanter & Feldman, supra note 102, at 77 (“This
process provides for initial litigation over essential patents and permits subsequent
litigation or court action on the remaining patents only after resolution of that initial
[law]suit.”).
273
Epstein, supra note 16, at 319; see also Dougherty, supra note 138, at 235–38.
274
See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 776.
275
Epstein, supra note 16, at 286.
276
See Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will it Evolve?,
25 HEALTH AFF. 1291, 1300 (2006) (“[I]ncreased uncertainty and [intellectual property]
litigation in biotech also would have major negative-incentive effects on capital market
decisions for developing private and public biotech firms with promising pipelines.”).
277
See Carver et al., supra note 249, at 815 (“In several respects, the patent provisions
of the BPCIA represented a radical departure from those contained in the Hatch-Waxman
amendments.”); Noel Courage & Ainslie Parsons, The Comparability Conundrum:
Biosimilars in the United States, Europe and Canada, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 215 (2011)
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BPCIA differs greatly from that of generic small-molecule drugs
prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.278 The Hatch-Waxman Act
requires the FDA to publish “a list”—known as the Orange
Book279—and update it on a monthly basis.280 A manufacturer
must then identify the numbers and expiration dates of the patents
that cover its branded drug publicly in the Orange Book.281 In contrast, the BPCIA does not require the FDA to publish a list of licensed biological products, including applicable patent and nonpatent exclusivities,282 but instead provides the patent dance as the
means in which patent disputes are resolved.283 The fact that the
BPCIA contains such a different process demonstrates that it is a
crucial aspect of the statute. Specifically, the statutory substitution
shows—and the legislative history agrees—that the efficiency of
the patent dance was part of this compromise between the two industries.284 Though the BPCIA is based on the Hatch-Waxman
Act, it has “several obvious differences.”285 The fact that the patent dance intentionally departs from the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
patent dispute process indicates that Congress believed that this
new process was better for the BPCIA and biologics.
(“There are also very distinct differences in the patent litigation pathways under the
BPCI Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).
278
Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012).
279
See Jacob S. Wharton, “Orange Book” Listing of Patents Under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1027, 1032 (2003) (“When the FDA approves a [new drug
application], the patent information submitted therewith is published in a publication
entitled ‘Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence,’ known in agency
parlance as the ‘Orange Book.’” (citing Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d
1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating HatchWaxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 245, 249–50
(1999))).
280
§ 355(j)(7).
281
§ 355(b)(1)(G); see Wharton, supra note 279, at 1032.
282
The “Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity and
Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, or “Purple Book,” which is modeled after
the Hatch-Waxman’s Orange Book, is not required by the BPCIA. Kurt R. Karst, The
“Purple Book” Makes Its Debut!, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), http://
www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/09/the-purple-book-makes-itsdebut.html [https://perma.cc/38DS-VSHH]. The FDA decided to initiate the Purple
Book as a reference guide, but it is still unclear how it will be used. Id.
283
See § 262(1).
284
See supra note 264.
285
Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 808 (2017); Lu, supra note 12, at 626.
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The BPCIA’s patent provisions contain other radical departures from those contained in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under the
BPCIA, process patents, which may not be listed in the Orange
Book, are addressed and may be asserted during litigation.286 Bringing a lawsuit under the BPCIA does not stay approval of the biosimilar application, as occurs under the Hatch-Waxman Act, when a
lawsuit is brought against the generic drug applicant in a timely fashion.287 Similarly, there is no statutory bar on FDA approval even
where the applicant indicates that it will wait until patent expiration, or—in very limited circumstances—where the RPS wins the
patent lawsuit.288 There also is no parallel in the BPCIA to the 180day exclusivity provided by the Hatch-Waxman amendments as an
incentive to challenge or design around patents.289 Perhaps the
most important departure from the patent litigation regime established by the Hatch-Waxman amendments is the conduct of the
litigation itself. Litigation under the Hatch-Waxman amendments
is traditional patent litigation—patentees can assert any nonprocess patents as to which a reasonable claim of infringement
could be made.290 In contrast, the BPCIA operates to prevent patentees from asserting the relevant patents during the initial phase
of litigation because the biosimilar applicant dictates how many patents can be asserted in the first instance.291
The clearly purposeful decision to depart from the HatchWaxman Act’s method of resolving patent disputes shows that
Congress believed that the efficiency of the patent dance is more
suitable for dealing with patent disputes of biologics. This presents
286

See § 262 (l)(2)(A) (providing that the applicant must provide information that
“describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological product that is the
subject of such application”).
287
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (providing for a thirty-month stay if the new
drug application holder sues the generic small-molecule drug applicant for patent
infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s provisions within forty-five days of the
generic’s notice letter).
288
See § 355(j)(5)(B) (specifying the timing of approval for an abbreviated new drug
application).
289
Compare § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), with § 262(l)(8)(A) (“The subsection (k) applicant shall
provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of
the first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”).
290
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
291
See supra text accompanying note 204.
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another reason why the patent dance should be mandatory. A mandatory patent dance ensures that that efficiency of the patent dance
is carried out in accordance with the compromise to maintain the
delicate balance.
2. A Mandatory Patent Dance Provides Certainty and
Transparency Which Is Necessary for the BPCIA’s Balance
Additionally, a mandatory patent dance provides certainty and
transparency that is crucial for both the biologic and biosimilar industry.292 The BPCIA deals with extremely complex issues.293 One
of the goals of the BPCIA is to incentivize innovation of new biologics, not just biosimilars.294 Further convoluting the path to innovate and mitigating the ultimate reward may jeopardize that incentive.295 An optional patent dance places all the power in the
hands of the biosimilars and allows them to choose a path that best
suits them strategically.296 Furthermore, the biologics manufacturers will not know for certain if they will be able to protect their biologics because they may not be able to enforce the manufacturing
patent(s).297 As discussed above, the manufacturing process patent(s) may be a biosimilar applicant’s strongest source of protection over the brand name biologic.298 For this issue itself, the patent
dance should be required so that the RPS can efficiently determine,
at the very least, if there is infringement. However, the need for
certainty and clarity is imperative and can only be achieved when
the steps are known (i.e., when the patent dance is mandatory).299
Mandating the patent dance brings certainty to all parties because
it permits the RPS, who owns (or licenses) patents that may be infringed by the biosimilar product, to litigate possible infringement
prior to the biosimilar’s market entry.300 This brings certainty to
the biosimilar applicants (indeed, a risk-free opportunity to deter292

See supra text accompanying notes 204–12.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
294
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mine whether they may market their products), and it also allows
the innovator to avoid multi-year patent litigation proceedings
while an infringing biosimilar product is eroding its market share.301
3. Manufacturing Patents of Biologics
The intersection that the BPCIA creates between pharmaceutical regulation and patent law is complex and sensitive.302 Biosimilar
manufacturers “will be forced to create a product that is similar
enough to satisfy the FDA, but different enough to avoid infringing
on the reference drug’s patent.”303 However, “the product is the
process,”304 and even small differences in a biologic’s manufacturing process may cause significant differences in the clinical properties of the final product.305 Therefore, the FDA must ensure that
the biosimilar’s manufacturing process closely resembles the
RPS’s manufacturing process.306 As explained above, the strongest
patents for biologics may be on the biologic’s manufacturing
process.307 Thus, biosimilar manufacturers must find an even narrower ground where they follow the process enough to comply with
the FDA’s regulations, yet do not infringe the biologic manufacturer’s patents.308 The variations that are allowed by the FDA must
also be significant enough to avoid an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.309
The key role manufacturing process patents play in biologics
makes it crucial that the biosimilar’s private manufacturing information is shared at the onset. Thus, the patent dance should be
301

See Epstein, supra note 16, at 317.
See supra note 11.
303
See Freilich, supra note 61 (offering a thorough discussion on how exactly these
alterations may occur).
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Tam, supra note 7, at 543.
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66 SMU L. REV. 59, 108 (2013).
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See supra Section I.B.
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See generally Freilich, supra note 61, at 29–48 (explaining exactly how biosimilars
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with the requirements of the BPCIA, yet not infringe on the patents of the original
biologic).
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Id. at 30; see also Freilich, supra note 306, at 80.
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mandatory to ensure that the requirement to share the secret manufacturing information of the biosimilar applicant is carried out.
This ensures that the original biologics patents, if infringed upon,
will be properly protected in a timely fashion, and indicates another
way in which the patent dance is more efficient and transparent.
The requirement to share the secret manufacturing information of
the biosimilar applicant can be a disadvantage for the applicant, because sometimes they do not want it to be quick for strategy purposes; however, that is exactly what the BPCIA was trying to prevent. One of the countervailing goals of the BPCIA was to maintain
the incentive to innovate.310 Inefficient patent infringement litigation and the increased uncertainty that it causes negatively impact
innovation.311
As discussed, the purpose of the patent dance regime of the
BPCIA was “to ensure that litigation surrounding relevant patents
will be resolved expeditiously and prior to the launch of the biosimilar product, providing certainty to the applicant, the reference
product manufacturer, and the public at large.”312 By sharing the
manufacturing information upfront both parties know immediately
which patents, if any, need to be litigated, thus bringing certainty to
all parties.313 Additionally, the BPCIA was a negotiated compromise.314 The addition of the manufacturing information was a key
component of this compromise. The compromise was essential to
maintain the balance of the BPCIA. A slight variation from that
compromise may skew the balance. Thus, the patent dance should
be mandatory as intended to protect the BPCIA’s balance.
Contrasting the BPCIA’s patent dance with the patent infringement litigation scheme of the Hatch-Waxman Act emphasizes the need for the patent dance to be mandatory. Among other differences between the BPCIA’s patent dance and the Hatch310
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311
See Grabowski et al., supra note 276, at 1300 (“[I]ncreased uncertainty and
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Waxman Act’s patent infringement litigation scheme, the BPCIA’s
procedures noticeably include manufacturing patents while the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s does not.315 This alteration strongly suggests
that this was intentional.316 The biosimilar applicant should not be
allowed to subvert this useful aspect by opting out of the patent
dance. Thus, the patent dance should be held to be mandatory to
ensure that the manufacturing information is shared as it was intended to be.
CONCLUSION
Determining exactly how to incentivize innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry while keeping prices relatively affordable
has historically been daunting and complicated. In drafting the
BPCIA, Congress attempted to accomplish that challenging feat
through transparency and communication.317 Congress solicited
and received input from all pertinent industries, reviewed the input
elicited, and used it to form a negotiated compromise that balances
the countervailing goals.318 That balance is represented in the
BPCIA, and every aspect that formed that compromise is crucial to
maintaining the balance. The patent dance, one of those key aspects, provides an efficient process that allows for the patents relevant to the biologic and biosimilar in question to be resolved as
quickly as possible. This process must not be allowed to be subverted at the biosimilar manufacturer’s whim. The negotiated
compromise was a mandatory patent dance and that is what must
be ensured.
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